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In this paper, we examine optimal portfolio decisions within a decentralized 
framework. There are many portfolio managers choosing optimal portfolio 
weights in a mean-variance framework and taking decisions in a 
decentralized way. However, the overall portfolio may not be efficient, as 
the portfolio managers do not take into account the overall covariance 
matrix. We show that the initial endowment that portfolio managers can use 
within the firm in order to manage their portfolios can be used as a control 
variable by the  top administration and redistributed within the firm in order 
to achieve overall efficiency.  
 
Keywords: Optimal Portfolio, Decentralized, Efficient Frontier, Portfolio 
Management. 
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1. Introduction 
 
One of the main tasks of portfolio managers is to achieve the best possible trade-off 
between risk and return. This task involves the determination of the best risk-return 
opportunities available from feasible portfolios and the choice of the best portfolio from 
this feasible set. However, in many situations, the portfolio is managed in a 
decentralized way, with the top administration of the firm delegating to different 
portfolio managers partial control about investment in subclasses of assets. 
In general, the top administration of trading firms decides the amount of wealth invested 
in certain asset classes. The top administration however delegates to portfolio managers 




The delegation process may imply in an overall inefficient portfolio. Even if all 
portfolio managers are in the efficient frontier for their particular asset class it may be 
the case that, in the aggregate, the resulting portfolio is an inefficient one as portfolio 
managers are not taking into account the overall covariance matrix and all possible 
combinations that would result in the best trade-off between risk and return.  
These considerations has led us to examine which conditions should be met so that even 
in a decentralized decision making set the overall portfolio would be efficient. Our 
findings suggest that the initial endowment available for investing by the portfolio 
managers and the risk free interest rate they face when taking investment decisions can 
be used as control variables to attain overall efficiency. 
Although we recognize that asymmetry of information play a crucial role in the 
delegation process, in this paper, we put these considerations to concentrate in the pure 
compatibility of solutions between the different portfolio managers with the overall 
                                                 
1 Classical articles in asset allocation choice are Tobin (1958) and Markowitz (1952, 1959).
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solution. Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer (1985) develop a model of decentralized 
investment management under asymmetric information, where they are especially 
concerned about screening agents with superior information and on the surplus 
extraction from the agent. Barry and Starks (1984) show that risk sharing considerations 
are sufficient to motivate the use of multiple managers. Stoughton (1993) investigate the 
significance of nonlinear contracts on the incentive for portfolio managers to collect 
information, justifying employment of portfolio managers with the notion of superior 
skills at acquiring and interpreting information related to movement in security prices.  
We solve the problem of finding equivalence between decentralized and centralized 
portfolio management analytically within a mean-variance framework, which provides 
some insights on how to enhance the delegation process.2  Our findings suggest that it is 
possible to decentralize investment decisions and construct portfolios that are still 
optimal in an aggregate sense. All that is needed are some instruments to control 
decisions taken by portfolio managers such as their available initial endowment and the 
risk free interest rate that they face, which may be determined endogenously in our 
model. 
We solve a general case with many portfolio managers that are specialized in some 
particular asset class (which may intersect or not in some cases), and show that the 
initial endowment that portfolio managers have to invest in their portfolios can be used 
by the top administration to achieve overall efficiency.  
The organization of the paper is as follows. In section II, we develop the model. Section 
III gives some interpretations of the results. Section IV concludes and gives directions 
for further research. 
 
                                                 
2 There may be other difficulties in implementing mean-variance analysis such as the extreme weights 
that may arise when sample efficient portfolios are constructed. As Genotte (1986) and Britten-Jones 
(1999) noticed, there are huge estimation errors in expected returns estimation, which cannot be ignored. 
However, we will not address these points in this paper.   6
2. The  model 
 
We start with n risky assets. Let w be the n x 1 vector of portfolio weights for risky 
assets,  V  the n x n covariance matrix, r the n x 1 expected return vector for all risky 
assets,  f r  the risk free interest rate and  p r  the portfolio’s expected rate of return. 
We characterize an investor’s preferences by utility curves of the following general 
form: 




pp p p f Ur r r σλ σ λ =− = +− −
TT T wr w1 wV w . (1) 
The first part of this utility function is the expected return of one dollar invested in the 
portfolio and the second part is half of the variance of one dollar invested in the 
portfolio multiplied by a scalar λ . The convenience of this utility function is that 
maximizing it is equivalent to find a frontier portfolio, as we will show below. The 
coefficient λ may be interpreted as a coefficient of risk aversion.3 Higher levels for 
() , U ⋅⋅  imply in higher utility for managers and (1) shows that utility increases if the 
expected return increases, and it decreases when the variance increases. The relative 
magnitude of these changes is governed byλ . 
An efficient portfolio is one that maximizes expected return for a given level of variance 
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Τ TT wr w1 wV w l . (3) 
                                                 
3 However, this is not the absolute risk aversion as defined in Arrow (1970) which is given by 
() () '' ' UU −⋅ ⋅ .   7
where λ  is a positive constant. The first order conditions are: 













TT -w r w 1
l
. (5) 
Observe that (3) is essentially equivalent to (1). The first order condition of (1) is 
exactly (4). As V  is a positive definite matrix, it follows that the first order conditions 






− =− wV r 1 . (6) 
In what follows, we will show equation (6) in a more convenient way. If we have n 


























Using Stevens’ (1998) direct characterization of the inverse of the covariance matrix, 
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where Ri
2  and βij  are the  R-squared and the coefficient for the multiple regression of 
the excess return for the k-th asset on the excess returns of all the other assets. The 
factor  ()
22
11 1 R σ −  is the part of the variance of the excess return for the k-th asset that 
cannot be explained by the regression on the other risky excess return returns, which is 
equivalent to the estimate of the variance of the residual of that regression. 
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This is the optimal solution for the top administration that takes decisions on an n risky 









−∑  can be seen 
as the constant of the regression of excess return of asset k on the excess returns of the 
other risky assets and the denominator  ()
22 1 kk R σ −  is the residual variance of that 
regression.  
To generate the equivalence between the solution of the top administration and of the 
decentralized decision made by portfolio managers, it is necessary to guarantee that 
wealth allocated by the top administration is the same as the wealth allocated by 
portfolio managers in each risky asset. We will now see some examples of how the 
equivalence problem may be solved. 
 
2.1  Example 1. One portfolio manager for each risky asset 
Suppose that we have a k-th portfolio manager that takes decisions regarding one risky 












=  (12) 
where  k λ  is the coefficient of risk aversion of the k-th portfolio manager and
 
, fk r is the 
risk free rate that he faces. The solution above shows that optimal weight in the risky 
asset is inversely proportional to the risk aversion and the level of risk and directly 
proportional to the risk premium offered by the risky asset. 
As this portfolio manager does not take into account the overall covariance matrix there 
is a small probability that this portfolio will be efficient in an overall sense. A sufficient 
condition for efficiency would be that the optimal weight of the top administration 
multiplied by this wealth would be equal to the portfolio manager’s optimal weight 
multiplied by the portfolio manager’s initial endowment. This equivalence result may be 
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∑ . (14) 





















 =−  − 

∑ , (15) 
where we used  , fk f rr =  (in this case we can allow the risk free interest rate to be the 
same for both the top administration and the portfolio manager). Equation (14) and (15) 
must hold for all n portfolio managers for each risky asset. This implies that the risk free 
interest rate or initial endowment may be different for portfolio managers. 
However, in general portfolio managers do not trade on one asset but in an asset class 
where there may be many assets. This motivates generalizations of the results obtained 
above. 
 
2.2  Example 2. One portfolio manager trading on two risky assets 
We can assume a k-th portfolio manager that takes decisions regarding two risky, assets 
1 and 2. Thus the optimal weights for this portfolio manager would be: 
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, (17)   11
where  1,k w  and  2,k w  are the optimal weights for assets 1 and 2, respectively and 
2
, ik R  is 
the r-squared of the regression of excess return of the i-th risky asset on excess return of 
the other risky assets managed by the portfolio manager k.  
Equivalence of results can be derived using the condition that the amount invested in 
each risky asset is the same. This condition for the first and second risky assets can be 
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∑  (19) 
where 
1
0,k W  and 
2
0,k W  are the available initial endowments that portfolio manager k has 
to invest in assets 1 and 2, respectively.  We can find endogenously the amount of initial 
endowments that the top administration must dispose to portfolio manager k by solving 





































































It is important to notice that this initial endowment depends of the risk aversion of 
individual portfolio managers and the top administration. 
It is interesting to notice that initial endowment available to the portfolio manager rises 
as the portfolio managers are more risk averse relatively to the top administration. As 
the ratio  k λ λ increases, more initial endowment can be disposed to portfolio manager   12
k. In general, the initial endowment disposed for portfolio manager k for a risky asset m 







































2.3  Example 3. Two portfolio managers trading in the same risky asset m 
An interesting example to analyze would be the case where there are two portfolio 
managers (k and j) trading on the same asset, say asset m.  In this particular case, 
equivalence could be obtained by: 
  ,0 , ,0 , 0
mm
mk k m j j m wW wW w W += . (23) 
As there is no particular reason for the top administration to use different initial 
endowments for portfolio managers, we have that  0, 0,
mm
































Expression (24) could be easily generalized for any number of portfolio managers 
trading on any specific risky asset. The top administration may choose to give different 
initial endowments for different portfolio managers to invest in the same asset, in this 
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In this case the initial endowment available for portfolio manager k would depend on 
the initial endowment available for portfolio manager j. We will analyze the general 
case in the next subsection section. 
 
2.4  A more general case: there are l portfolio managers and n risky assets 
Suppose that we have l portfolio managers and n risky assets. Portfolio managers are 
specialized in subsets  12 ,,, l mm m K  where  k m  corresponds to the subset that the k-th 
portfolio manager trades. It is assumed that  kj mm ≠∅ I  for some  , ; kj k j ≠ . The 
restrictions that should apply are given by: 
 
1
1, 0, 1 0
1
2




























In this case the top administration decides which assets each portfolio manager should 
trade. The examples above help to understand how the top administration would solve 
his problem. If there are more than one portfolio manager in a single asset then the top 
administration could solve the problem as shown in example 3. If there is only one 
portfolio manager in a single asset then he could solve the equivalence result as shown 
in example 1. Finally, if portfolio managers trade in more than one asset, all that the top 
administration has to do is to use different initial endowment for each risky asset. 
 
3.  Interpreting the results 
 
In this section, we do some comparative static and interpret the expressions previously 
found. It would be interesting to understand what happens to portfolio managers’ initial 
endowment (or the risk free interest rate) when the exogenous parameters change.     14
If we use expression (15) then the initial endowment would depend on changes in the 






















∂ − ∑ . (26) 
The sign of this derivative is positive, reflecting the growth of interest in investing in 
risky asset k by the top administration (which can be seen from (11)). We could also 
answer how the wealth would change for a given portfolio manager that trades on asset 




















The sign of this derivative depends on the beta coefficient, i.e., in the correlation 
between assets. If the correlation is negative then the top administration would increase 
the initial endowment to induce an increase in investment in asset k. The increase 
investment in an asset negatively correlated with the asset that improved its expected 
return is due to a hedge effect. On the other hand, if correlation were positive then the 
initial endowment would be reduced to reduce the risk exposure of the overall portfolio. 
We can interpret expression (22), which gives the optimal initial endowment that should 
be available for a portfolio manager in order to obtain the equivalence result.  The initial 
endowment available depends on the ratio of the risk aversion coefficients. The greater 
k λ  the more risk averse is portfolio manager k. If this portfolio manager is more risk 
averse than the top administration then he would be propense to underinvest in asset m. 
In that case the top administration would increase the portfolio manager’s initial 
endowment in order to induce an increase in the portfolio manager’s risk exposure. 
0,
m
k W  also depends on the ratio of the Residual Sharpe Ratios. The greater the Residual 
Sharpe Ratio of the top administration relative to the Residual Sharpe Ratio of the 
portfolio manager for asset m the more willing the top administration is to increase the 
portfolio manager’s initial endowment in asset m. Increasing the initial endowment 
would make the portfolio manager invest more in that particular asset.   15
From expression (29) we can derive an interesting relation between the initial 
endowments of portfolio managers. The partial derivative of portfolio manager’s k 
initial endowment for asset m with respect to the initial endowment of portfolio 
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This expression gives us the rate at which the top administration would decrease 
(increase) portfolio manager k initial endowment after increasing (decreasing) portfolio 
manager  j initial endowment. This trading rate is dependent on the risk aversion 
coefficients ratio and the Residual Sharpe Ratio Coefficients. 
4. Conclusions 
In general, decentralization of portfolio allocation would not generate an efficient global 
portfolio as decentralized decisions do no take into account the overall covariance 
matrix.  
It is possible to use the risk free interest rate and the available initial endowment for 
portfolio managers in order to generate an equivalence of portfolio allocation results and 
find an efficient global portfolio. If portfolio managers trade in more than one risky 
asset then the top administration could use the initial endowment available for investing 
in each risky asset as a control variable to obtain the equivalence result. This means that 
the top administration could redistribute the initial endowment among portfolio 
managers as exogenous parameters change at the beginning of the portfolio building 
process. We used here a type of second welfare theorem. 
Our findings suggest that the risk free interest rate and the initial endowment used as 
control variables depend on a number of parameters and on risk aversion coefficients. 
This motivates further research on estimation of risk aversion coefficients. As it is 
widely known these coefficients are not directly observable and to our knowledge there   16
are not many published work that estimates individual risk aversion coefficients4. This 
is left for further research. 
Another interesting question would be to answer what is the optimal number of 
portfolio managers that a firm should have. This is a very important problem that 
trading firms deal with all the time and is still an open question. 
Agency considerations and the use of multi-period portfolio selection models would be 
another important route to explore within decentralized investment management5. 
However, our approach could be use in a dynamic framework. The top administration 
must define the investment horizon for the firm and other portfolio managers and at the 
end of each period he would coordinate and redistribute initial endowment among 
portfolio managers. Nonetheless, this extension raises the question of how well portfolio 
managers would have performed within the investment horizon period and this would 
lead to asymmetric information considerations among portfolio managers as well. 
There are many open questions yet. As the literature on this theme is almost 
nonexistent, we answered very simple questions. This is a first step, yet important, 
towards an understanding of how delegation of portfolios can be made without loosing 
overall efficiency. However, there are many questions to be made and answered. They 
are left for further research. 
                                                 
4 Sharpe et alli (1999) derive the risk tolerance for an investor using the equation for an indifference 
curve of an investor having constant risk tolerance. Their solution depends of the optimal weights given 
by managers for risky assets, on the variance and expected excess return of the portfolio.   
5  Sharpe (1981) analyzes decentralized investment management in a different framework. Konno and 
Yamazaki (1992), Porter (1973), Pyle and Turnovsky (1970), Roy (1952) and Pye (1972) analyze 
different approaches to the mean-variance portfolio criteria such as the safety-first and stochastic 
dominance criteria.   17
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